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Numerous attempts have been made to incorporate uncertainty 
into the neoclassical theory of the firm. The initial work of Arrow 
and Debreu first accomplished this by assuming a complete set of con­
tingent claim markets. In their model, a stock market permitted an 
optimal sharing of risks and firms acted in the best interests of 
their stockholders by maximizing their stock market value. The major 
criticism of this work stems from the fact that all risks are insurable 
and that further investigation was required to understand an economy 
where risks are shared incompletely . 
The move to a model which does not possess the equivalent of 
a complete set of contingent claim markets encountered a major difficulty 
in attempting to specify a firm's objective. In a model with incomplete 
markets, consumers no longer necessarily impute the same set of contingent 
claim prices and there will generally be disagreement on the determination 
of an optimal production plan based on value maximization . To circumvent 
this problem various studies1 assumed that firms maximize the expected 
utility of profits. As Radner (1970) has pointed out, this approach 
essentially begs the question since there is no attempt to relate the 
behavior of the firm to the preferences of its owners. It is instead an 
expression of "the divorce of ownership from management. " The fact that 
firms make risk averse decisions need not imply that firms are expected 
utility maximizers . Indeed, by using the appropriate contingent claim 
prices, value-maximizing firms will make decisions which reflect the 
risk preferences of their stockholders . 
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the criterion of 
value maximization when price uncertainty is present . Whereas we wish 
to work within a perfectly competitive framework, we will make one 
alteration to the usual set of competitive assumptions . Since we wish 
to focus on behavior in an economy where risks may only be shared incom­
pletely, we will restrict certain forms of entry into the capital market . 
Indeed, if we would allow unrestricted entry, we would expect to find 
that the market would soon possess the equivalent of a complete set of 
contingent claim markets. Individuals could easily accomplish this by 
trading in the separate contingent claim components of any existing 
stream of returns . To prevent this unpackaging, we will allow only a 
specific type of entry . Namely, we will allow entering firms to offer 
return functions from a predetermined set of functions, This set will 
include only those return functions which are initially present in the 
economy, This assumption precludes purely financial entry, but makes all 
existing technologies for the production of returns freely accessible . 
With entry restricted in this fashion, we will show that entry 
into the capital market will take place until there are as many firms 
offering independent patterns of returns across states of nature as 
there are random prices in the economy . Even though a complete sharing 
of risks generally will not be possible when this condition is satisfied, 
we will show that value-maximizing firms will make Pareto optimal 
2 pr2�uction decisions by relying upon prices inherent in the stock market, 
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The crucial point that establishes this is that while individuals impute 
different sets of contingent claim prices, they must all impute the same 
certainty-equivalent prices . In this context, a certainty-equivalent 
price is the amount an individual would pay for an asset which returns 
the random price . It will then be shown that if purely financial entry 
is also permitted, then the above conclusions will continue to hold. 
What our restricted form of entry serves to highlight is that our con-
clusions are not a consequence of permitting a form of complete risk-
sharing . 
Further, if the return function of a firm in each possible 
state of the world is simply the profit of that firm in each state we 
will show that the decision rules which result are simply analogs of the 
familiar rules which are obtained for a profit-maximizing competitive 
firm under certainty . For example, statements such as "firms should 
choose input levels such that the value of the marginal product of a 
factor equals the factor price" become "firms should choose input levels 
such that the certainty-equivalent value of the marginal product of a 
factor equals the certainty-equivalent factor price." 
I .  THE MODEL 
We begin with a two-period, state preference model by assuming 
that there is only a single commodity which is available for consumption 
now, c0, or which may be invested into firms in order to provide for 
consumption later if state of the world 6 occurs, c6, 6 = l, . .. , S .  Also 
3 
4 
assume that there are I individuals in this economy, each possessing an 
-i endowment of the commodity, c , and a portfolio consisting of fractions, 
-i s., of each firm j. Each firm must choose the level of its decision J 
variables, xj, which determines the values of the firms, V.(x) , and the J 
returns each firm offers next period if state of the world 8 occurs, 
A. Investors 
Each individual is assumed to maximize his utility of consumption 
both now and later by choosing his portfolio of security holdings. We do 
not require that the individual be an expected utility maximizer but instead 
assume that he acts so as to maximize a more general utility function 
i i i i U (c0,c1, • • •  , c8) subject to the budget constraints 
i N c0 + E j=l 
i N -i c + E v3. (x) sj j=l 
a 1, ... ,s 
e 1, . . .,s . 
Assuming the utility function of each individual is sufficiently 
regular, and allowing unlimited short sales, the first-order conditions 
are given as 
j 1, . . . , N  (1) 
where 
and e 1, ... ,s, 
denote individual i's marginal utility for consumption now and for 
consumption later if state of the world 8 occurs, respectively. Each 
individual imputes a set of contingent claim prices for consumption in 
state of the world 8 as 
ui e 
--.-
, 
ui 0 
e 1, . . .  ,s, i l, ._ .. ,I. 
At this point we should note that if there is not the equivalent of a 
complete set of contingent claim markets, the first-order conditions 
. i provide us with a set of N equations in S(>N) unknowns, Pa· Thus, there 
is no reason that individuals will necessarily impute the same set of 
contingent claim prices,3 
B. Firms 
We will begin by assuming that there are N firms 
in the economy, and since we wish to examine the effects of price uncer-
tainty we will assume that each firm's return function if of the form 
e 1, ... ,s, 
j l, . .. ,N, 
where w(8) is a 1 x K vector of prices which occur in state 8 and 
(2) 
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fj(xj) is a K x 1 vector of state-independent decision functions of firm j. 
Note that if some of the prices are nonstochastic, the functional form 
given by (2) may be altered by letting wk(8) = wk for some k. 
We further assume that no random price is perfectly correlated 
with any set of other random prices, To see that this assumption is 
6 
not particularly restrictive, suppose that wk(8) is perfectly correlated 
with {w1(8) , .. . ,wK_1(8) } .  I n  this case there exist constants a1, . • .  ,aK-l' 
such that 
K-1 
E a.w.(8) , 
j=l J J 
0 = 1, ... ,s, 
and the price wK(8) may be replaced by this sum in (2). 
Let us next consider the value of firm j which offers these 
returns. Using any arbitrary individual's set of contingent claim prices, 
this value is given by 
(3) 
The usual difficulty that adses here i.s that, ;i,J; there are fewer .Urms than 
possible states of the world which may occur, then production decisions of 
firms are not invariant to the set of contingent claim prices used. This 
problem need not arise, however, if individuals agree upon each certainty-
equivalent price given by 
�j k k l, ... ,K, 
i,j= 1,. .. ,I, 
(4) 
'Vi, h 1 i h h where wk is t e va ue individual i would pay for an asset w t t e same 
state distribution of returns wk(8) as the random price k. In the event 
of agreement upon these imputed values, we would argue that the firm 
should use these prices, which are inherent in the stock market, to 
make its value-maximizing decisions. Thus firm j would perceive its 
value as 
and acting as a price taker, would determine its decisions from the 
first-order conditions given by 
o. 
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For an arbitrary set of preferences in the economy, all individuals 
will impute the same certainty-equivalent prices if and only if there are 
as many firms that offer independent patterns of returns across states of the 
world as there are random prices. From (1) 
K j j i i:: fk(x ) wk' k=l 
j l, ... ,N. 
and if there are fewer firms than prices then there are K - N + 1 linearly 
independent certainty-equivalent prices vectors, wi, which may be imputed.4 
Thus only when N = K will (4) be satisfied, 
C. Entry 
As we discussed in the introduction, we will restrict entry into 
the capital market by requiring that any new firm must offer a state 
distribution of returns as generated by an already existing return 
function. More formally, let Rj be the Sx 1 vector valued return function 
possessed by firm j and define the initial set of return functions R as 
R = {Rj(') ,  j = l, . . .  ,N}. 
Then any new firm, say the (N+l) st, will offer a stream of returns given 
b RN+l( N+l) h RN+l( ) R y x , w ere • E • 
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In essence, this assumes that all 
existing technologies for the production of returns are freely accessible 
and precludes any entry into the economy with a new technology. 
We may now demonstrate that the economy postulated here will not 
be in equilibrium unless there are at least as many firms offering indepen-
dent patterns of returns as there are random prices . This will be done by 
showing that unless this condition is not satisfied then there is a riskless 
5 profit that may be earned by some entrepreneur. Consider the entry oppor-
tunities for the (N + l) st firm. If there are at least two individuals, i 
and j, who impute different values to a stream of returns the firm can 
feasibly generate, then the entrepreneur can extract a riskless profit from 
them. i Let VN+l be the values imputed by the two individuals and, without 
loss of generality, suppose that Then the entrepreneur may 
choose E > 0 and o > 0 such that - E > V�+l + o and there is some 
number of shares sN+l that individual i will buy from the entrepreneur 
- E and individual j will sell short to the entrepreneur for 
such that he will earn a prof it of 
i j 
[VN+l - E - (VN+l + o) ]sN+l > 0. 
What remains to be shown is that there are at least two individuals 
which impute different values if the entering firm offers a stream of re-
turns which is independent of those offered by existing firms. Since we 
have assumed that an arbitrary set of preferences are present in the economy, 
we are free to assume that all K - N + 1 linearly independent vectors of cer­
�i tainty-equivalent imputations, w , are present. Next, let us determine how many 
linearly independent decision function vectors, f, are possible such that all 
individuals impute the same value to these functions. The equations 
v 
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provides us with a set of K - N + 1 equations in K unknowns. Thus there are 
N linearly independent decision function vectors for which all individuals 
will impute the same value, and if the (N + l) st firm offers an independent 
pattern of returns, at least two individuals must impute different valua-
1 tions to that firm. 
II. A MUTUAL FUND INTERPRETATION 
Let us begin by examining a trivial case in which (4) is satisfied. 
Suppose there exists a sufficient number of "futures" markets in which 
traders may speculate or hedge against future price fluctuations . In 
this case, there is an asset corresponding to each random price and 
'V 
• all individuals will agree upon wk' which may now be interpreted as 
the equilibrium value of a futures contract returning wk(8) . In this 
model, any firm whose return function is given by (2) may be inter­
preted as a mutual fund with a portfolio consisting of f�(xj) contracts 
returning the future price wk(8) , k = l, • . .  , K .  The value of a firm 
is given as 
which is precisely the sum of the values of the contracts it holds. 
If the firm does not believe that its actions will affect the equili-
brium price of any "futures" contract, value maximization will lead to 
the decision rule given by (5). 
Even in the absence of actual "futures" markets, we may continue 
to use this interpretation. To see this, reexamine the budget constraint 
of each individual . Recall that, for individual i, consumption in state 
of the world e is given by 
N j z: r
]
. as]
.,  
j=l 
i where s
j is individual i's ownership fraction of firm j. Using (2), 
N • . i E w(8) fJ(xJ ) s. 
j=l J 
N K 
. j i 
j
:
l k
:
l
wk(8) f�(x ) sj 
(6) 
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Since the random prices are the only source of uncertainty in the model, 
let us refer to each random price as the return on a "fundamental" 
security. In this light, each firm j may be though of as a mutual fund 
which holds f�(xj) of the kth "fundamental" security and, from (6), 
N j ' i th individual i holds the quantity E fk(x
J ) s
J
. of the k "fundamental" 
j=l 
security. It is well known that when an individual may purchase any 
combination of the "fundamental" securities, his opportunity set is not 
smaller than the set when he is constrained to hold a portfolio consisting 
6 
of N < K mutual funds, · When there are as many mutual funds as securities, 
then the individual is indifferent between being able to purchase the 
securities or only the mutual funds, 
The value of each "fundamental" security is given by substituting 
(2) into the first-order conditions to the investor's utility maximization 
problem as 
i s ui vju0 E 8=1 e 
or 
K 
f�(xj) v. E J k=l 
K 
f� (xj) E 
k=l 
K . j E wk(e) f�(x ) ,  k=l 
s i E p8wk(8) 8=1 
'Vi wk 
j 1,. . .  ,N 
j l,. . .,N (7) 
Only when there are as many independent mutual funds (firms) as 
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"fundamental" securities, N = K, will all individuals, independent of their 
preferences, necessarily agree upon the value of these securities, This 
results since (7) provides us with a set of K equations in K unknowns, 
'Vi wk. Since each individual is confronted with the same set of equations, 
they must necessarily agree upon each certainty-equivalent price, 
It is instructive to reexamine Diamond's model in this frame-
work. He assumes that there is a riskless asset which returns r and N 
risky assets, each of which returns 
j=l,. . .  ,N. 
where f.(8) is the multiplicative technological uncertainty which confronts 
J 
firm j, gj(k j) is the firm j's state-independent production function, and 
k . is the amount of input used by firm j. There are N + 1 assets and 
J 
N + 1 certainty-equivalent values, 
and 
s i E Pe• 8=1 
j 1,. • .,N 
to be imputed. Thus, the conditions outlined above are satisfied. 
Proceeding with Diamond's model, he normalizes the price of the riskless 
asset to be one which requires 
s i 1 E Pe r' e=l 
and the value of the firm is given by 
g. (k. ) J J 
Value-maximization requires that 
} <lgj (kj) 
j <lk j 
1, 
which is precisely his result.7 
s 
In a competitive environment with entry as defined above, 
we would argue that there will always be agreement with regard to 
12 
certainty-equivalent prices. To the contrary, suppose there is some 
disagreement, then some investor will perceive that a firm, say firm j, 
is making suboptimal decisions. This investor may freely replicate 
that firm by choosing Rj(•) from Rand operate it at the level he 
desires. This process will continue until agreement is reached and, 
from above, we know that there will never need to be more firms than 
random prices. 
Let us conclude by considering the implications of this free 
entry argument for a competitive industry. We will define an industry 
as the set of all firms which possess the same return function, say 
Rj(•) eR. Until there are a sufficient number of firms to ensure agree-
ment about the certainty-equivalent prices, each firm may operate at a 
different level. Once there is a sufficient number of firms, however, 
all firms will face the same set of prices and will operate at the 
same level. Hence, since all firms in an industry are then identical, 
there is essentially only one firm available in which individuals may 
13 
invest and the entire argument must be repeated if firms wish to make 
subsequent decisions. This result is hardly surprising as it states that 
even in the presence of uncertainty, the number of firms in a competitive 
industry is indeterminate. 
III. VALUE-MAXIMIZING DECISION RULES 
As we have previously indicated, if firms take the certainty-
equivalent prices as given, then value maximization requires that 
o. 
Let us consider the implications of this rule in the context of two 
special examples. Following Leland (1974) , let us assume the return 
function for a competitive firm is specified as 
where the price at which the firm may sell its output, pj(8) , is.
random, 
q
J
. is the output decision of firm j, and C.(q.) is a known, nonstochastic, J J 
convex cost function. Assuming the existence of a riskless firm which 
earns a rate of return r ensures that all individuals will agree upon 
and 
s 
E 
8=1 
s 
E 
8=1 
1 
r 
Thus the value-maximizing firm will make its output decision such that 
l:c'.(qj) .  r J (8) 
It can be immediately seen that the standard result for profit maxi-
mization under certainty that "price equals marginal cost" becomes, 
under uncertainty, that "the certainty-equivalent price equals the 
certainty-equivalent marginal cost." If we solved explicity for 
'V pj from (1), we would find that 
or that 
C. (q .) + rVj J J 
and value maximization requires that the firm chooses its output such 
that average cost, computed as average variable cost plus the average 
cost of capital, equals marginal cost. 
Alternatively, suppose the return function of a firm is 
specified as 
where fj(xj) is a concave production function of the firm, x{( is the 
amount of factor k used by the firm, p(6) is the random output price 
and wk(e) , k = l, . • •  ,K, are random input prices, Once there are a 
14 
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sufficient number of firms in the industry to guarantee agreement about 
the certainty-equivalent prices, the value-maximizing decision rule becomes 
'V w, 
or that the certainty-equivalent factor price equals the certainty-equivalent 
value of the marginal product of that factor. As a special case of this 
functional form, let us reconsider Diamond's model which was outlined 
above. If we interpret his multiplicative technological uncertainty 
factor, fj(e) , as a random output price we find 
V. + k. 
J J , 
gk(kj) 
or that the certainty-equivalent is just the average market value of 
output. This results since V. + k. is the sum of the market value of J J 
profits plus the market value of factor payments. Thus his result that 
the firm should choose its level of capital so that 
1 
in essence equates the firm's value of its marginal product with the 
price of a unit of capital. 
IV. CONSTRAINED PARETO EFFICIENCY 
Prior to examining the efficiency properties of the equilibrium 
obtained under value maximization, it is essential to point out that the 
best we can hope for here is constrained Pareto efficiency, This results 
since we are imposing the institutional constraint of a stock market by 
allowing only a redistribution of claims to each firm's returns and 
the number and opportunities of firms are given. As Diamond has 
previously pointed out this is tantamount to requiring that each 
individual's consumption pattern across states of the world be a 
linear combination of firms' return patterns. 
With this stock market constraint in mind the constrained 
Pareto-efficiency problem may be stated as: for arbitrary Ai� O, 
solve the problem 
subject to 
maximize 
I i I N I -i I N j -i l.: c0 + 
l.: l.: Vj(x
j) s� ,:S l.: c + l.: l.: V .(x ) s .  
i=l i=l j=l i=l i=l j=l J J 
I 
l.: Si < 1 
i=l j = 
e 
i 
j 
l, . . .,s, 
1, . .  . ,I, 
1,. . .,N, 
where the dual variables associated with the constraint are given in 
parentheses. The conditions for consumption efficiency are given by 
AiUi 0 - µ o, i 1,. • . ,I, 
AiUi - i o, i 1,. • . ,I, e p 
e 1,. . .,s, 
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(µ) 
(9) 
(10) 
and 
and, for production efficiency, by 
N avk 
I -i i l.: l.: µ (sk sk) + k=l dXj i=l 
0 
s I i l.: l.: Pe 6=1 i=l 
i 1,. . . ,  I 
j 1,. . . , N. 
K j j 
l.: w (8) afk(x ) 
k=l k j ax 
j 1,. . . ,N. 
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i s .  
J 
To verify the conditions for consumption efficiency, (11) requires that 
By (9) and (10), this requires 
s 
l.: 
8=1 
i . . u8wk(8) f�(x
J) 
ui 0 
s 
i.: 
uh 
e=1 8 
h,i = 1, 
• • •  ,I. 
K 
l.: wk(8) f�(xj) k=l j = 1, . . •  ,N, 
� h,i = 1,. . . ,I. 
It is easy to see that this is satisfied for our model in equilibrium 
by examining the first-order condition, (1) . Paralleling Diamond, we 
may interpret the return pattern of a firm over states of the world as 
a joint product and (13) requires that the marginal rate of substitution 
for these joint products must be equated across consumers. If there are 
(11) 
0 (12) 
(13) 
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as many firms as prices (K = N) , the state-independent decision functions 
may be eliminated from (13) , and the consumption efficiency result requires 
that 
s i s h E u8wk(8) E u8wk(6) 'Vi 6=1 8=1 'Vh wk ui uh 
wk, j = l, .. . ,N, (14) 
0 0 h, i, = 1, ... , I, 
or that all investors must impute the same set of certainty-equivalent 
prices, 
I i Further, since E s 
i=l j 
I -i E s. 
i=l J 
1, the condition for production 
efficiency, (12) reduces to 
K 
0 E 
k=l 
K 
µ E 
k=l 
K 
µ E 
k=l 
<Hj (xj) I k E 
s 
E i i 
ax-1 i=l 8=1 Pe Wk (8) sj 
s i 
(lf� <x-1) I E u6wk(8) 
E 8=1 
axj ui i=l 0 
Clfj (xj) 'V k , by (14), if K wk axj 
i s
j' by (9) and (10) , 
I 
E s� N, and 1. 
i=l J 
This requirement coincides with our value-maximizing decision rules, 
(7). 8 
If there are fewer firms than random prices, the production 
(15) 
(16) 
efficiency condition (15) may still be obtained from value maximization 
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if the firm uses i i E p8sj as the appropriate shadow price for its returns i 
in state 6. Although this result has been previously obtained by 
Dreze (1974), there is one major difficulty that arises since the 
firm will generally be unable to find these prices by relying on 
information implicit in the stock market. Instead, it requires that 
all investors must reveal their own contingent claim prices to the 
firm, but in the absence of some incentive compatible mechanism, they 
generally will not reveal truthfully. 
V. EXPECTED UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 
As we discussed in the introduction, many studies have 
assumed that firms maximize the expected utility of their future 
prices. Due to this, we wish to establish a set of conditions which 
will result in Pareto efficient production decisions under this criterion. 
We will assume that the profit of the firm in each possible state of the 
world is the return it offers its shareholder in each state which, by 
(2), is w(8) fj(xj) ,  Suppose the firm wishes to maximize EUj(w(8) fj(xj) ) ,  
where the utility function and probability assessments are those of (say) 
the manager. Without any further restrictions, the firm will choose levels 
of its decision variables so as to satisfy 
Euj (lf
j (J) 8 w(6) axj 0, 
where Uj is the marginal utility of profits in state 8. By itself, it e 
is unlikely that (17) will coincide with the condition for production 
(17) 
efficiency since there is no reason to believe that the firm imputes the 
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"correct" set of certainty-equivalent prices. 
We can overcome this difficulty by allowing the firm to hold 
a portfolio of securities which may include some of the firm's own 
shares which it retains as treasury stock? Letting g� be the proportion 
1 
of the shares of firm i purchased by firm j, the profit, IT.(8, xj) ,  that J 
accrues to its shareholders is given by 
(1 - g�) IT. (8, �) 
J J 
where i is the riskless rate of interest. The firm may be thought of as 
borrowing g�vk at the riskless rate of interest in order to purchase 
the shares of firm k. It then must repay the amount igk
jVk from its 
profits. If the firm now maximizes its expected utility of profits 
with respect to (xJ, gj) ,  the necessary optimality conditions are 
0 l "' j 
0 
0 
If there are as many firms as random prices, (18) and (19) ensure that 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
the firm will impute the same certainty-equivalent prices as each investor, 
i .e .  
Vl, l = 1 ,  . .. ,N. (21) 
Here, the firm's contingent claim prices are defined as 
Ujnj ____u ' 
iEU� 
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where n� is the firm's subjective probability that state of the world 
8 will occur. 
If we further assume that the firm uses its certainty-equivalent 
prices to forecast changes in the values of all firms, then differentiating 
(21) and using � yields 
0 
K 
E 
k=l 
s 
E 
8=1 
for j f l 
otherwise, 
Substituting this condition in (20) will cause the firm to chose the 
level of its decision variables such that 
iEU� av o. 
(22) 
As long as there are private shareholders (g� < 1) , the firm will choose J 
to maximize the value of the firm and, by (22) , it will make Pareto-
efficient decisions. 
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We should point out that the assumption that the firm uses 
its imputed certainty-equivalent prices to forecast value changes is 
perhaps very strong. Whereas value-maximizing firms will find these 
prices inherent in the stock market and exhibit price-taking behavior 
with respect to them, there is no reason to believe that utility-
maximizing firms need to perceive that these prices, as they have 
imputed them, will remain unchanged as they vary their production 
decisions. Furthermore, if we wish this criteria to hold for arbitrary 
sets of random prices, an even stronger condition would be needed. 
Namely, the firm's set of imputed contingent claim prices should be 
invariant to changes in its decision variables. Thus its utility 
function must satisfy 
()Jij (8 ,x-1) j 
Clp� 
= 
iU�8n8 
j 
arrj (8 ,x ) 
0 
Clxj EU8 u8n8
iEu88 Clxj 
Clxj [iEU8J
2 
where ()
2U �2-. Rewriting (22) gives
 
ClIIj 
EU88 ClII.(8,x
j) 
m;- Clxj 
8 
8 
1,. . .,s 
(23) 
1,. . .,s. 
Since the right hand side of this equation is invariant with 8, this 
reduces to the requirement that the product of the firms marginal profit 
in a state with its measure of absolute risk aversion in that state must 
23 
be constant across states of the world. I h n ot er words, for a given 
profit function, a firm's utility function will satisfy (23) only if 
it satisfies 
8,cj> 1, .. . ,s. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
As I have discussed elsewhere, the decision rules that result 
from value maximization are identical to those derived in the recent 
literature on stockholder unanimity.10 The contributors to this 
literature reject the notion of value maximization, however. In a sense, 
they are formally correct since the decisions which are made do not 
maximize the actual market value of the firm. d In eed, in an economy 
with incomplete markets, what we have termed as certainty-equivalent 
prices may vary with a change in a firm's decision variable. It is 
precisely this point which allows Stiglitz (1972) to conclude the value­
maximizing decisions are not efficient. On the other hand, we would 
argue that a firm must rely on the information implicit in the stock 
market and act as a price taker with respect to the certainty-equivalent 
prices. In this case, the firm may be thought of as acting to maximize 
its perceived value. 
This same difficulty arises when we consider expected utility 
24 
maximizing firms. In this case, the certainty-equivalent prices are 
imputed by the firm and requiring then to act as a price taker with 
respect to these imputed prices appears to be an even stronger assumption. 
25 
FOOTNOTES 
* I wish to express my thanks to David Cass, Walter Dolde, and Milton 
Harris who served as my thesis committee. Any remaining errors are 
my res�onsibility. 
1. See Baron, Leland (1972), and Sandmo, for example. 
2. This was previously pointed out by Diamond (1967). 
3. Unless, of course, we place restrictions on the set of preferences 
in the economy. We do not care to do this in this study, 
4. This results since any non-homogeneous system of N linear equations in 
K unknowns possesses N - K + 1 linearly independent solutions. 
5. This argument is in the same spirit as that given by Satterthwaite 
(1977) . 
6, See Cass and Stiglitz (1970).  
7. See Diamond's equation (25) . Since he assumes the investor maximizes 
his expected utility of future consumption, the imputed contingent 
claim prices are given by 
where ni(6) is investor i's subjective probability that state of the 
world e will occur. 
26 
8. It may be shown that in the unconstrained Pareto efficiency problem 
that the production decisions continue to be efficient; however, 
the consumption decisions are not. In general, the consumption 
decisions will be efficient (in an unconstrained sense) only when 
there exists the equivalent of a complete set of contingent claim 
markets. For a fuller discussion of this, see the author. 
9. This.approach is a generalization of one used in Baron and Forsythe 
(1976) . 
10. See Ekern (1974), Ekern and Wilson (1974) , and Leland (1973, 1974) . 
27 
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